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SHIELDING THE PLAINTIFF AND PHYSICIAN: THE
PROHIBITION OF EX PARTE CONTACTS WITH A
PLAINTIFF'S TREATING PHYSICIAN
INTRODUCTION
[W]hatever, in connection with my professional practice, or not in
connection with it, I see or hear, in the life of men, which ought
not to be spoken abroad, I will not divulge as reckoning that all
such should be kept secret . . ..
This oath "has come down through history as a living state-
ment of ideals to be cherished by the physician."2 Physicians thus
are sworn to respect the private facts they discover about their pa-
tients. Appropriately, the law also respects the realm of privacy
which surrounds the physician and his patient. The protection of
this privacy right is statutory in many jurisdictions, 3 including
North Carolina." However, the privilege may be waived, either ex-
pressly5 or impliedly.6 Does the fact that the privilege may be
1. Oath of Hippocrates.
2. Current Opinions of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the
American Medical Association at vii (1986).
3. Annotation, Discovery: Right to Ex Parte Interview With Injured Party's
Treating Physician, 50 A.L.R. 4th 714, 717 (1986).
4. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1989). The statute provides:
No person, duly authorized to practice physic or surgery, shall be re-
quired to disclose any information which he may have acquired in at-
tending a patient in a professional character, and which information was
necessary to enable him to prescribe for such patient as a physician, or to
do any act for him as a surgeon, and no such information shall be consid-
ered public records under G.S. 132-1. Confidential information obtained
in medical records shall be furnished only on the authorization of the
patient, or if deceased, the executor, administrator, or, in the case of
unadministered estates, the next of kin. Any resident or presiding judge
in the district, either at the trial or prior thereto, or the Industrial Com-
mission pursuant to law may, subject to G.S. 8-53.6, compel disclosure if
in his opinion disclosure is necessary to a proper administration of jus-
tice. If the case is in district court the judge shall be a district court
judge, and if the case is in superior court the judge shall be a superior
court judge.
5. Capps v. Lynch, 253 N.C. 18, 22, 116 S.E.2d 137, 141 (1960). The right
may be waived expressly by contract. Id.
6. Id. at 22, 116 S.E.2d at 141.
1
Woodard: Shielding the Plaintiff and Physician: The Prohibition of Ex Part
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1991
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
waived entitle defense counsel to conduct ex parte interviews with
a plaintiff's treating physician? "[S]tatutes governing waiver of the
physician-patient privilege do not specifically allow or prohibit ex
parte interviews."7 Some jurisdictions allow ex parte interviews,
basing their decisions on such factors as facilitation of early settle-
ment and a reduction in litigation costs.6 The jurisdictions which
do not permit ex parte interviews rely on the availability of formal
discovery devices 9 and potential for abuse by defense counsel as
the basis of their decisions.1" North Carolina decided not to permit
ex parte interviews with plaintiff's treating physicians in Crist v.
Moffatt."
As a result of Crist, defense counsel in North Carolina are con-
fined to traditional forms of discovery where a plaintiff's treating
physician is concerned.12 This decision properly extends protection
to the physician and patient in personal injury litigation during
pretrial by assuring the patient that his attorney will be present to
advise the physician how much information he is legally permitted
to disclose.13
This Note will first explore the physician-patient privilege and
the underlying policies which are often implicated in cases con-
fronting challenges to ex parte interviews. Next, this Note will ex-
amine the reasoning from the jurisdictions which permit and those
which prohibit ex parte interviews. Finally, this Note will analyze
the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision to prohibit ex parte
interviews.
THE CASE
Hazel Marie Crist filed a medical malpractice action on De-
"The privilege is waived by implication where the patient calls the physi-
cian as a witness and examineshim as to the patient's physical condition,
where the patient fails to object when the opposing party causes the phy-
sician to testify, or where the patient testifies to the communication be-
tween himself and physician."
Id. at 23, 116 S.E.2d at 141.
7. Annotation, supra note 3, at 717.
8. Trans-World Invs. v. Drobny, 554 P.2d 1148 (Alaska 1976).
9. Weaver v. Mann, 90 F.R.D. 443 (D.N.D. 1981).
10. Wenninger v. Muesing, 307 Minn. 405, 240 N.W.2d 333 (1976).
11. Crist v. Moffatt, 326 N.C. 326, 389 S.E.2d 41 (1990).
12. Id. at 336, 389 S.E.2d at 47.
13. Id. (citing Roosevelt Hotel Ltd. Partnership v. Sweeney, 394 N.W.2d 353,
357 (Iowa 1986)).
[Vol. 13:233
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cember 4, 1986, alleging that the defendant, Dr. Robert C. Moffatt
performed surgery and rendered post operative care negligently. 14
After filing an answer, the defendant served the plaintiff with in-
terrogatories and requests for production of medical bills incurred
as a result of defendant's alleged negligence. 15 The plaintiff pro-
duced records of her treatment by Dr. James W. Tyson and Dr. F.
Alan Thompson, and identified them as physicians who would tes-
tify as to the facts and circumstances of their treatment of the
plaintiff prior to surgery."6
The defendant's attorney deposed the plaintiff and asked her
questions about the treatment rendered by nonparty treating phy-
sicians, including Drs. Thompson and Tyson." Some time later,
the defendant's attorney met privately with both Drs. Thompson
and Tyson."8 The defendant's attorney admitted that he told both
doctors that the plaintiff had waived the physician-patient privi-
lege. 9 Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to compel disclosure
of the defendant's attorney's private conversations with the plain-
tiff's nonparty treating physicians.20 The plaintiff also requested
that the court prohibit the use at trial of any information obtained
during the private interviews and that the court prohibit any fur-
ther ex parte contacts.2 The trial court found that the plaintiff
had not waived her privilege prior to the date of the ex parte con-
tacts.22 The court also found that no resident or presiding judge
had entered an order compelling disclosure pursuant to N.C. Gen.
Stat. §8-53, nor had a resident or presiding judge entered an order
finding that the plaintiff had waived the physician-patient privi-
lege by providing copies of her medical records, by testifying con-
cerning her medical treatment at her deposition, or by identifying
the doctors as witnesses or by not objecting to the deposition of
any nonparty witness.2 3 The court concluded upon these facts that
the defendant's attorney acted improperly by discussing plaintiff's
medical care and treatment with her nonparty treating physicians
14. Crist, 326 N.C. at 328, 389 S.E.2d at 42.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 328, 389 S.E.2d at 42-43.
17. Id. at 328, 389 S.E.2d at 43.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 329, 389 S.E.2d at 43.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
1991]
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without first receiving the plaintiff's consent.2 The court issued an
order compelling the defendant's attorney to disclose the sub-
stance of all the private conversations.2 5 The court also ordered the
defendant to refrain from further ex parte contacts with the non-
party treating physicians without the plaintiff's knowledge and
consent or without a court order.2
BACKGROUND
A. The Physician-Patient Privilege
The physician-patient privilege is an underlying concern in
most cases that address the propriety of ex parte interviews. In
determining whether or not to permit ex parte interviews, courts
are concerned with the potential wrongful disclosure of informa-
tion which is generally protected by the physician-patient privi-
lege. Questions arise over whether the privilege has been waived
and whether a waiver in itself is so broad that it justifies permit-
ting defense counsel to conduct ex parte interviews. Because the
privilege is usually implicated in these cases, it warrants
discussion.
At common law there was no privilege protecting the confiden-
tiality of physician-patient communications.2 Some states have
adopted the privilege in limited circumstances by judicial construc-
tion,28 but most states have enacted legislation which protects phy-
sician-patient communications.2" North Carolina enacted legisla-
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 330, 389 S.E.2d at 43.
27. State v. Martin, 182 N.C. 846, 849, 109 S.E. 74, 76 (1921).
28. Note, Defendants' Right to Conduct Ex Parte Interviews with Treating
Physicians in Drug or Medical Device Cases, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1451, 1459 (1989).
Alabama judicially recognized a limited physician-patient privilege absent a statu-
tory privilege in Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 708-09, 287 So. 2d 824, 829-30
(1973). Id.
29. As of 1985, 40 states and the District of Columbia had passed physician-
patient privileges. Developments in the Law - Privileged Communications, 98
HAav. L. REv. 1450, 1532 (1985). The statutes generally have five requirements for
the physician-patient privilege. Kmentt, Private Medical Records: Are They Pub-
lic Property?: A Survey of Privacy Confidentiality and Privilege, 1987 MED.
TRIAL TEca. Q. 274, 277. The person barred from testifying must fit the statutory
definition of covered medical personnel. The protected information must flow
from a defined medical relationship. The information must come from a commu-
nication or an observation. The patient's treatment must require the information.
Finally, the information must be confidential. Id.
[Vol. 13:233
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tion protecting the confidentiality of this relationship in 1885.30
"Section 8-53 of the North Carolina General Statutes creates a tes-
timonial privilege; that is, it grants a patient the right to prevent
his or her physician from testifying to the confidential information
received from the patient during treatment. '"31 In North Carolina,
the privilege is not confined only to information orally communi-
cated by the patient.3 2 It also applies "to knowledge obtained by
the physician or surgeon through his own observation or examina-
tion while attending the patient in a professional capacity, and
which was necessary to enable him to prescribe." 3 However, some
states do have statutes which limit the 'privilege to oral communi-
cations. 4 Federal law does not recognize a physician-patient privi-
lege at all.3 5
. A variety of policy reasons exist for protecting the physician-
patient privilege. The privilege induces patients to make full dis-
closure so that proper treatment may be given. 36 It also prevents
30. Id. "G.S. 8-53 as interpreted by our Supreme Court has the effect of
amending this common law rule." State v. Bryant, 5 N.C. App. 21, 25, 167 S.E.2d
841, 845 (1969).
31. Amicus Curiae Brief for the North" Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers at
7, Crist v. Moffatt, 326 N.C. 326, 389 S.E.2d 41 (1990) (No. 86 CVS 3823).
32. Smith v. Lumber Co., 147 N.C. 62, 64, 60 S.E. 717, 718 (1908).
33. Id.
34. Simms v. Charlotte Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 257 N.C. 32, 37, 125 S.E.2d
326, 330 (1962). Ohio is a state which limits the privilege to communications by
the-patient, but the court holds that a "communication may be not only by word
of mouth, but also by exhibiting the body or any part thereof to the physician for
his opinion, examination or diagnosis." Meier v. Peirano, 76 Ohio App. 9, -, 76
Ohio App. 9, -, 62 N.E.2d 920, 922 (1945)(quoting Ausdenmoore v. Holzback,
89 Ohio St. 381, 106 N.E. 41 (1914)).
35. Federal courts rely on the individual state's common law. Rule 501 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence states:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the-United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, gov-
ernment, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of
the United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in-civil
action and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense
as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a
witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall
be determined in accordance with State law.
FED. R. EVID. 501.
36. But see 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2380a (McNaughton rev. 1961) (ab-
sence of the privilege will not deter people from seeking medical aid or from con-
1991]
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public disclosure of socially stigmatizing diseases, and in some in-
stances, protects patients from self-incrimination.3 7 "The law rec-
ognizes a privilege because the benefits derived from protecting the
physician-patient relationship outweigh the costs of confidential-
ity, including the inhibition of fact-finding during litigation. '"
The privilege belongs soley to the patient;3 .a physician or sur-
geon may not refuse to testify.40 However, the privilege is not abso-
lute.41 Under the North Carolina statute, a physician may be com-
pelled to testify if the presiding judge finds that disclosure is
necessary to a "proper administration of justice. 4 2 In such a case
the judge must enter upon the record his finding that the testi-
mony is necessary to the proper administration of justice. 3
The privilege may be waived expressly4 or by implication. 45
sulting physicians freely).
37. Simms, 257 N.C. at 36, 125 S.E.2d at 329.
38. Note, supra note 28, at 1460. See also 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2380a
(McNaughton rev. 1961), testing the physician-patient privilege against the fun-
damental canons which must be satisfied by every privilege for communications.
Does the communication originate in a confidence? Is the inviolability of
that confidence vital to the due attainment of the purposes of the rela-
tion of physician and patient? Is the relation, through disclosure, greater
than the expected benefit to justice? A negative answer to any one of
these questions would leave the privilege without support.
Id.
39. Capps v. Lynch, 253 N.C. 18, 22, 116 S.E.2d 137, 141 (1960).
40. Simms, 257 N.C. at 38, 125 S.E.2d at 331.
41. Id.
42. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 reads in pertinent part: "Any resident or presiding
judge. . . may. . . compel disclosure if in his opinion disclosure is necessary to a
proper administration of justice." The 1953 version of the North Carolina statute
has been mentioned favorably for requiring disclosure where necessary. See 8 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2380a (McNaughton rev. 1961). The 1937-38 ABA Commit-
tee on the Improvement of the.Law of Evidence commented that the North Caro-
lina statute allowed a "wholesome flexibility" with its "needed but rare interpre-
tation." Id.
43. Simms, 257 N.C. at 38, 125 S.E.2d at 331. But see, State v. Bryant, 5 N.C.
App. 21, 28-29, 167 S.E.2d 841, 847 (1969), where the trial judge did not enter a
finding upon the record but the court of appeals held that the act of ruling was
itself a finding of necessity.
44. Capps v. Lynch, 253 N.C. 18, 22, 116 S.E.2d 137, 141 (1960). See Note,
supra note 28, at 1462. "Most jurisdictions require that the waiver be voluntary
and clearly intentional." Id. It is "similar to the traditional concept of waiver used
in contract or constitutional law, which courts define as the 'intentional relin-
quishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.'" Id. (quoting Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1968)).
45. Capps, 253 N.C. at 23, 116 S.E.2d at 141. See also 1 BRANDIS ON NORTH
[Vol. 13:233
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The patient may waive the privilege by implication by voluntarily
discussing the nature of his injuries or testifying to what the physi-
cian did or said while in attendance.' 6 The privilege is impliedly
waived when the patient discusses these matters because the pa-
tient breaks the fiduciary relationship with the physician by re-
vealing the communications."7 By breaking the fiduciary relation-
ship, the patient demonstrates that the confidences no longer need
to be protected.'8 However, mere general statements about the pa-
tient's physical condition does not waive the privilege."9 When
there is a waiver, it applies not only to communications with the
physician, but also to the physician's opinions.50 The basic reason
that courts will imply a waiver is the inherent unfairness to a de-
fendant that would result without an implied waiver. The unfair-
ness would arise when the plaintiff used information gained from
his treating physician and then tried to hide information which
might help the defendant's case.0 1
B. Ex Parte Interviews
Ex parte interviews are generally available for use with non-
expert witnesses prior to formal depositions.52 The ex parte inter-
views are neither expressly permitted nor prohibited under a
state's rules of civil procedure." However, the confidential rela-
CAROLINA EVIDENCE §63 (3d ed. 1988). See also supra note 6.
46. Cates v. Wilson, 321 N.C. 1, 14, 361 S.E.2d 734, 742 (1987).
47. Id. at 15, 361 S.E.2d at 742-43.
48. Id. at 15, 361 S.E.2d at 742-43. "Having taken this position, the plaintiff
may not silence the physician as to matters otherwise protected by the privilege."
Id.
49. Capps v. Lynch, 253 N.C. 18, 23, 116 S.E.2d 137, 141-42 (1960).
50. Cates v. Wilson, 321 N.C. 1, -15, 361 S.E.2d 734, 742 (1987). The court
refers to allowing testimony about facts without allowing the physician to testify
as to his opinions as a divisible waiver. The divisible waiver is not allowed because
it could enable plaintiffs to elicit factual details and preclude the physicians from
putting them in a legal context. Id. at 16, 361 S.E.2d at 743.
51. Capps, 253 N.C. at 24, 116 S.E.2d at 142. "It is a shield and not a sword
to those who can or may not speak." Id. (citing Insurance Co. v. McKim, 6 N.E.2d
9, 12 (Ohio 1935)).
52. Experts must be deposed formally under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal
Rules Of Civil Procedure. This rule does not apply to witnesses who are mere
actors in or viewers of the transactions at issue. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory
committee's note; 48 F.R.D. 487, 503 (1969-70).
53. See Wenniger v. Muesing, 307 Minn. 405, 240 N.W.2d 333, (1976) (hold-
ing that nothing in the rules contemplates ex parte interviews). The Wenniger
court was influenced by the fact that the rules of civil procedure provide protec-
1991]
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tionship which exists between physician and patient distinguishes
the physician from the ordinary witness. Deciding whether or not
to allow ex parte interviews requires a court to weigh the compet-
ing interests of the physician-patient privilege against the interests
advanced by permitting defense counsel to conduct ex parte inter-
views." As a result, considerable debate exists over the propriety
of ex parte interviews with a plaintiffs treating physicians.
1. Views Supporting Ex Parte Interviews
a. Waiver
Some courts focus on the waiver of the physician-patient priv-
ilege as the basis for allowing ex parte interviews. Those courts
reason that "if no privilege exists or it has been waived, no party is
entitled to restrict an opponent's access to a witness."5 The courts
adopting this reasoning emphasize that no party has a proprietary
interest in any witness' evidence.5 "Absent a privilege no party is
entitled to restrict an opponent's access to a witness, however par-
tial or important to him, by insisting upon some notion of alle-
giance. '57 Following this line of reasoning, if defense counsel is not
impeded by a privilege, he may, before trial, ask any witness what
he knows. 8
b. Efficiency
Courts also allow ex parte interviews because they save time
and money and facilitate early settlement. 9 An interview of a wit-
tive measures to the physician patient-privilege which would not be present in ex
parte settings. Id. at 410-11, 240 N.W.2d at 336-37. But see Trans-World Invs. v.
Drobney, 554 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Alaska 1976) (finding nothing in the rules to limit
informal methods of discovery).
54. Stempler v. Speidell, 100 N.J. 368, 373-74, 495 A.2d 857, 859 (1985).
55. Sterchi & Sheppard, Defendant's Right to Secure Medical Records Con-
cerning the Plaintiff, 53 UMKC L. Rnv. 46 (1984). See also, Green v. Blood-
sworth, 501 A.2d 1257, 1259 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985)(stating that once the privilege
is waived a physician is like any other witness).
56. Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126, 128 (D.D.C. 1983).
57. Id. at 128 (citing International Business Machines Corp. v. Edelstein, 526
F.2d 37, 41-44 (2d Cir. 1975)).
58. Id. at 128. See also Sklagen v. Greater S.E. Community Hosp., 625 F.
Supp. 991 (D.D.C. 1984) (following waiver, defense counsel may interview plain-
tiff's treating physicians to ascertain if they possess relevant information).
59. See, e.g., Doe, 99 F.R.D. at 128; Stempler v. Speidell, 100 N.J. 368, 373-
74, 495 A.2d 857, 859 (1985); Transworld Inv's. v. Drobny, 554 P.2d 1148 (Alaska
1976). Ex parte interviews "should be encouraged as should other informal means
240 [Vol. 13:233
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ness is less costly than a deposition and is easier to schedule. 60 An
interview is also a "cost efficient means of eliminating non-essen-
tial witnesses . . . completely."61
c. Permissible Under the States' Rules of Civil Procedure
Moreover, none of the various rules of civil procedure or any
other statutes forbid ex parte interviews. 62 "The ex parte interview
is an effective discovery procedure which operates outside of and is
not precluded by federal discovery rules."6 3 Relying on this reason-
ing, some courts conclude that ex parte interviews are permissible
since they are not expressly forbidden. Under this analysis, the
competing interests of all parties are presumably protected." First,
since it is unrealistic to assume the plaintiff's physician will agree
to an interview without plaintiff's consent, the defendant's interest
is protected by a rule which permits the trial court to compel a
plaintiff to execute an authorization. 65 Second, a plaintiff's interest
is protected by conditions which require the defendant to provide
plaintiff's counsel with reasonable notice of the time and place of
the interview.6 6 Finally, the physician's interests will be protected
if he is informed that he need not cooperate if he believes the in-
terview would compromise his responsibilities.6 7 An overriding
of discovery that reduce the cost and time of trial preparation." Stempler, 100
N.J. at 382, 495 A.2d at 864.
60. Missouri ex rel. Stuffiebam v. Appelquist, 694 S.W.2d 882, 888 (Mo. App.
1985) (disapproved by Missouri ex rel. Woytus v. Ryan, 776 S.W.2d 389 (Mo.
1989)).
61. Id. (citing Doe, 99 F.R.D. at 128).
62. Stempler, 100 N.J. at 380, 495 A.2d at 863.
63. Sklagen v. Greater S.E. Community Hosp., 625 F. Supp. 991, 992 (D.D.C.
1984). In this case the defendant sought an order requiring plaintiff to execute an
authorization allowing the treating physician to be interviewed. The court held
that the federal rules simply were not implicated by the defendant's request be-
cause the authorization requested did not require or order disclosure from the
physician; it merely permitted such disclosure. Id.
64. Stempler, 100 N.J. at 381, 495 A.2d at 863. The defendant's interest is
the right to interview the physician without being confined to the expense and
inconvenience of formal discovery, the plaintiff's interest is to prevent disclosure
of confidential information which is still subject to the privilege, the physician's
interest is prevention of inadvertent disclosure of still privileged information and
protection from the ethical and legal penalties for such disclosure. Id. at 381-82,
495 A.2d at 863-64.
65. Id. at 382, 495 A.2d at 864.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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theme in the cases which follow this reasoning is the concern that
the plaintiff will use his privilege not as a shield, but as a sword 68
or trial tactic by controlling the timing and circumstances of the
release of information. 9 The rationale of these cases can be boiled
down to one idea. Although a state's rules of civil procedure pro-
vide "certain specific formal methods of acquiring evidence from
recalcitrant sources by compulsion, they have never been thought
to preclude the use of such venerable, if informal, discovery tech-
niques as the ex parte interview of a witness who is willing to
speak."7
d. Discovery of Work Product
Another concern that occasionally surfaces is the threat that
the defense attorney's work product will be invaded. This is be-
cause the party holding the physician-patient privilege will be able
to monitor progress in the defendant's case by being present at
interviews.71
2. Views Prohibiting Ex Parte Interviews
a. Protection of Confidential Relationship
Courts prohibiting ex parte interviews rely heavily upon the
special nature of the physician-patient relationship. Public policy
strongly favors protection of the confidential and fiduciary rela-
tionship existing between a physician and his patient. 7 The prohi-
bition against ex parte interviews is not statutory nor is it found at
common law; rather it is an "emerging court-created effort to pre-
serve the treating physician's fiduciary responsibilities during the
68. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2380a (McNaughton rev. 1961) ("It is certain
that the practical employment of the privilege has come to mean little but the
suppression of useful truth." Id.).
69. Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126, 128 (D. D.C. 1983). Another per-
ceived threat in not compelling plaintiff to give authorization to the physician to
speak is the intimidation of the witness by forcing him to discuss matters at his
own risk after he voluntarily agrees to an interview, which is improper influence
in itself. Id. at 128.
70. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (cited in Doe, 99 F.R.D. at 128,
and Sklayen v. Greater S.E. Community Hosp., 625 F. Supp. 991, 993 (D.D.C.
1984).
71. Doe, 99 F.R.D. at 128-29.
72. Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, 148 Ill. App. 3d 581, 587, 499 N.E.2d 952,
957 (1986), appeal denied, 106 Ill. Dec. 55, 505 N.E.2d 361 (1987), cert. denied,
483 U.S. 1007 (1987).
[Vol. 13:233
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litigation process. '73 Thus, courts prohibiting ex parte interviews
look beyond what may technically be permissible because of si-
lence of the statutes and the common law. Instead they focus on
the policy behind the physician-patient privilege and decide that
policy rather than efficiency should prevail.74
i. The Physician's Code of Ethics
For several hundred years physicians have acknowledged their
obligation to keep a patient's confidences in trust.75 The American
Medical Association's (AMA) principle IV states that "a physician
shall respect the rights of patients . . . and shall safeguard patient
confidences within the constraints of the law."'76 The Current
Opinions of the Judicial Council of the AMA impose an additional
instruction to the physician to maintain patient confidences.7 7 Sec-
tion 5.06 of the Current Opinions deals directly with the attorney-
physician relationship. It states that "the patient's history, diagno-
sis, treatment, and prognosis may be discussed with the patient's
lawyer with the consent of the patient . ".. 78 Courts have re-
peatedly found that a patient has a right to rely on a physician's
ethical obligation to protect the confidential relationship.79
Thus, confidentiality and patient consent are inextricably tied to-
gether; the relationship between a patient and his physician re-
mains confidential only as long as a patient can rest assured that
he must give his consent before any of the information disclosed
73. Manion v. N.P.W. Medical Center, 676 F. Supp. 585, 593 (M.D. Pa.
1987).
74. PetriUo, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 609-10, 499 N.E.2d at 971. The Petrillo court
found the reasoning of courts allowing ex parte interviews to be flawed because
they attempt to deal with a question of great societal importance by merely look-
ing to a set of codified rules and procedures for the answer. Id.
75. Petrillo, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 589, 499 N.E.2d at 958 (referring to the Hip-
pocratic Oath).
76. AMERICAN MEDICAL Ass'N PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS (IV) printed in
CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS OF THE
AMERICAN MEDICAL Ass'N at ix (1986).
77. Section 5.05 states: "The information disclosed to a physician during the
course of the relationship between physician and patient is confidential to the
greatest possible degree ... The physician should not reveal confidential commu-
nications or information without the express consent of the patient, unless re-
quired to do so by law."
78. CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS OF
THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N at 21 (1986).
79. Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 801
(N.D. Ohio .1965).
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during the physician-patient relationship is released to third
parties.8 0
For this reason ex parte interviews undermine physician-patient
confidentiality. 1
ii. The Fiduciary Relationship Between Physicians and
Patients
The fiduciary relationship between the patient and his physi-
cian is another policy consideration which warns against ex parte
interviews.8 2 Because of the fiduciary relationship, the patient
should have the right to expect that his physician will provide the
sought after information pursuant only to formal discovery rules.83
The duty of care owed to the patient includes a duty to aid the
patient in litigation, and further includes a duty to refuse affirma-
tive assistance to the patient's antagonist.8 4 If the treating physi-
cian agrees to discuss the patient's case ex parte, the potential for
breach of the patient's confidence would have a chilling effect upon
the physician-patient relationship. 5 The patient's counsel should
be present in order to allay the patient's fears that his physician
may be disclosing personal confidences.86
Furthermore, in the absence of the patient's attorney, the phy-
sician may inadvertently disclose information which may result in
potential liability for the physician. Although the physician may
80. Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, 148 Ill. App. 3d 581, 590, 499 N.E.2d 952,
958-59 (1986).
81. Petrillo, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 590, 499 N.E.2d at 959. Petrillo also holds
that the implied waiver by filing a suit waives the privilege only to matters in
issue and is limited only to formal discovery. Since the consent is limited, any
other disclosure by the physician would not have the consent of the patient and
therefore would be unethical. Id.
82. Duquette v. Superior Court, 161 Ariz. App. 269, 275, 778 P.2d 634, 640
(1989). The court states that "ex parte communications between defense attor-
neys and plaintiff's treating physicians would be destructive of both the confiden-
tial and fiduciary natures of the physician-patient relationship which have been
recognized by statutory and case law." Id. at 275, 778 P.2d at 640.
83. Petrillo, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 594-95, 499 N.E.2d at 961.
84. Anker v. Brodnitz, 98 Misc. 2d 148, 152, 413 N.Y.S.2d 582, 585 (1979),
aff'd, Anker v. Brodnitz, 73 App. Div. 2d 589, 422 N.Y.S.2d 887 (2d Dept. 1979),
app. dism'd, Anker v. Brodnitz, 51 N.Y.2d 743, 432 N.Y.S.2d 364, 411 N.E.2d 783
(1980).
85. Manion v. N.P.W. Medical Center, 676 F. Supp. 585, 593 (M.D. Pa.
1987).
86. Wenninger v. Muesing, 307 Minn. 405, 411, 240 N.W.2d 333, 337 (1976).
87. Duquette v. Superior Court, 161 Ariz. App. 269, 276, 778 P.2d 634, 641.
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legally refuse an interview, often the physician does not have suffi-
cient understanding of discovery rules to know that he may re-
"fuse.8 8 Therefore, if the court allows ex parte interviews, the physi-
cian is at greater risk of liability because he may feel compelled to
meet with defense counsel.89 A rule against ex parte interviews
would reduce the chance of the physician breaching his fiduciary
duty to the patient. Such a rule would also prevent unnecessary
lawsuits against physicians for wrongful disclosure.90
b. Preservation of Defendant's Rights
A prohibition against ex parte interviews is separate and dis-
tinct from the physician-patient privilege.9 1 The privilege deter-
mines what is discoverable, while the prohibition only determines
how it may be discovered. 2 Therefore, the defendant is not denied
any information. Along these lines, one court stated:
[W]e are not prohibiting a treating physician from expression of
his opinions in a deposition or from testifying in a court of law.
Nor does our decision infer that a plaintiff has a right to stop his
treating physician from so testifying . . . . [W]e are merely im-
posing a prohibition on a single type of unauthorized practice. 3
Moreover, a defense attorney can obtain exactly the same
amount of information through formal discovery as he can through
ex parte contacts.9 When the same information can be obtained
through either formal or informal methods, formal discovery must
See also, Watts v. Cumberland County, 75 N.C. App. 1, 10, 332 S.E.2d 242, 249
(1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 317 N.C. 110, 343 S.E.2d 879 (1986), rev'd on
other grounds, 317 N.C. 321, 345 S.E.2d 879 (1986) (holding that a physician may
be liable for medical malpractice for the unauthorized disclosure of a patient's
confidences.).
88. Duquette, 161 Ariz. App. at 276, 778 P.2d at 641.
89. Id. After the doctor. agrees to an interview, that interview may dis-
integrate into a discussion of the impact of a jury's award. Id.
90. Anker v. Brodnitz, 98 Misc. 2d 148, 152, 413 N.Y.S.2d 582, 585 (1979),
aff'd, Anker v. Brodnitz, 73 App. Div. 2d 589, 422 N.Y.S.2d 887 (2d Dept. 1979),
appeal dismissed, Anker v. Brodnitz, 51 N.Y.2d 743, 432 N.Y.S.2d 364, 411
N.E.2d 783 (1980).
91. Manion v. N.P.W. Medical Center, 676 F. Supp. 585, 593 (M.D. Pa.
1987).
92. Id.
93. Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, 148 Ill. App. 3d 581, 600-01, 499 N.E.2d
952, 965 (1986), appeal denied, 106 Ill. Dec. 55, 505 N.E.2d 361 (1987), cert. de-
nied, Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, 483.U.S. 1007 (1987).
94. Id. at 596, 499 N.E.2d at 962.
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be used if "it is necessary to protect a privileged communication,
such as between a physician and a patient."9
c. Extent of Waiver Unknown
Once the physician-patient privilege has been waived, ex parte
interviews still should not be permitted because of the difficulty in
determining to what extent the privilege is waived. If the scope of
the waiver is left up to the determination of the defense attorney
and physician, both will be put in an "untenable position."96 Even
if no improper pressures are exerted over the plaintiff's treating
physician, determining the scope of the waiver is still quite diffi-
cult.9 7 Placing the burden of determining relevancy on an attorney
who does not know the nature of the confidential disclosure to be
elicited is risky.9 8 Asking the physician who is untrained in the law
to assume this burden is an even greater risk.99 Determining
whether a physical or mental condition is in controversy often re-
quires careful judicial scrutiny and not a mere cursory reading of
the complaint.10 If disclosure is restricted to formal discovery or
express consent, the patient's attorney may object to improper dis-
closure and the court will be able to regulate disclosure, thereby
preventing unlawful or unethical disclosure.10
ANALYSIS
The question of whether the North Carolina courts would al-
low ex parte interviews with treating physicians came before the
supreme court in Crist v. Mofjatt.10' The trial court found that the
95. Karsten v. McCray, 157 Ill. App. 3d 1, 14, 509 N.E.2d 1376, 1384 (1987),
appeal denied, 117 Ill. 2d 544, 115 Ill. Dec. 400, 517 N.E.2d 1086 (1987).
96. Duquette v. Superior Court, 161 Ariz. App. 269, 276, 778 P.2d 634, 641
(1989).
97. Anker v. Brodnitz, 98 Misc. 2d 148, 152, 413 N.Y.S.2d 582, 585, aff'd, 73
App. Div. 2d 589, 442 N.Y.S.2d 887 (2d Dept. 1979), appeal dismissed, 51 N.Y.2d
743, 432 N.Y.S.2d 364, 411 N.E.2d 783 (1980). "The determination of whether a
physical or mental condition is in controversy often requires careful judicial scru-
tiny and not a mere cursory reading of the complaint." Id. at 152, 413 N.Y.S.2d at
585.
98. Roosevelt Hotel Ltd. Partnership v. Sweeney, 394 N.W.2d 353, 357
(Iowa 1986).
99: Id. at 357.
100. Anker, 98 Misc. 2d at 152, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 585.
101. Id. at 152, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 586.
102. Crist v. Moffatt, 326 N.C. 326, 389 S.E.2d 41 (1990).
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defense attorney acted improperly by conducting the interviews0 "
and the court of appeals dismissed the defendant's appeal.10' The
supreme court decided the matter was important enough to vacate
the decision of the court of appeals and consider the case on the
merits. 05
In Crist, the defendant's first assignment of error was the trial
court's failure to find a waiver of the physician-patient privilege
when the plaintiff provided copies of her medical records to oppos-
ing counsel, testified at her deposition concerning her treatment by
other doctors, and identified Drs. Thompson and Tyson as wit-
nesses.1 6 The court recognized that a plaintiff may waive the privi-
lege at the time of trial.1 0 7 However, the defendant tried to con-
vince the court that an implied waiver could take place before trial
as well. 1 The defendant contended that no meaningful distinction
exists between disclosures occurring before trial and disclosures
made during trial. 09 However, this contention was flawed. For
there to be an implied waiver, the plaintiff must voluntarily go into
the details of his or her injuries." 0 Arguably, a plaintiff's testimony
prior to trial is not voluntary since it is compelled by the rules of
discovery, thereby precluding the possibility of implied waiver
based on voluntariness."' The court did not, however, decide on
the waiver issue. The court merely assumed without deciding that
the plaintiff impliedly waived the privilege.1 2
In deciding the question of the permissibility of ex parte inter-
103. Id. at 329, 389 S:E.2d at 43.
104. Crist v. Moffatt, 92 N.C. App. 520, 374 S.E.2d 487 (1988). The court
determined that the trial court's order did not deprive the defendant of any right.
Id. at 523, 374 S.E.2d at 488.
105. Crist, 326 N.C. at 330, 389 S.E.2d at 44.
106. Id. at 330-31, 389 S.E.2d at 44.
107. Id. The court cited from Cates v. Wilson, 321 N.C. 1, 361 S.E.2d 734
(1987) and Capps v. Lynch, 253 N.C. 18, 116 S.E.2d 137 (1960) for the ad hoc test
used by those courts to establish an implied waiver by a plaintiff's activity at
trial. See supra note 5.
108. Crist, 326 N.C. at 331, 389 S.E.2d at 44.
109. Id.
110. Capps, 253 N.C. at 23, 116 S.E.2d at 142 (1960).
111. State ex rel. Grimm v. Ashmanskas, 298 Or. 206, 213 n. 3, 690 P.2d 1063,
1067 n. 3 (1984) (en banc). "We do not believe the legislature intended waiver to
occur when a plaintiff in a personal injury or malpractice case is required by the
opponent to submit to a pretrial discovery deposition, because in that situation
the holder of the privilege is not voluntarily offering his or her confidential com-
munications or personal condition to the public." Id.
112. Crist, 326 N.C. at 331, 389 S.E.2d at 44.
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views, the court first acknowledged that in the majority of jurisdic-
tions defense counsel is limited to formal discovery. The majority
includes states in which the physician-patient privilege is either
statutorily waived upon filing a lawsuit,11 or deemed by judicial
decision to be waived upon the filing of a lawsuit.1"" However, the
court here based its decision on grounds separate. from the statu-
tory privilege, focusing instead on public policy.11 5
The primary policy reason underlying the court's decision in-
volved the unique and confidential nature of the physician-patient
relationship.1 6 The uniqueness of the relationship arises partly
from the physician's ethical guidelines.117 Although not mentioned
in the opinion, another factor behind this policy is the fiduciary
nature of the physician-patient relationship. 18 North Carolina
courts have been quick to protect this relationship.1 9 Therefore,
the decision not to allow ex parte interviews follows logically from
other North Carolina decisions protecting the physician-patient
privilege. Furthermore, the public has a right to rely upon the ex-
pectation that physicians will not reveal their confidences. 12 0 A de-
cision by the court to permit defense counsel to conduct ex parte
interviews would have undermined this expectation because pa-
113. Wenninger v. Muesing, 307 Minn. 405, 240 N.W.2d 333 (1976).
114. Anker v. Brodnitz, 98 Misc. 2d 148, 413 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1979), aff'd, 73
App. Div. 2d 589, 422 N.Y.S.2d 887- (2d Dept. 1979), app. dism'd, 51 N.Y.2d 743,
432 N.Y.S.2d 364, 411 N.E.2d 783 (1980).
115. Accord Loudon v. Mhyre, 110 Wash. 2d 675, 756 P.2d 138 (1988) (en
banc)(holding that ex parte interviews are prohibited as a matter of public pol-
icy). "An act can be against public policy even though it is not specifically prohib-
ited by a state's statutes or constitution .... Public policy has been defined as
that principle of law which holds that no subject can lawfully do that which has a
tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good." PetriUo, 148 Ill.
App. 3d at 587, 499 N.E.2d at 956-57.
116. Crist v. Moffatt, 326 N.C. 326, 333, 389 S.E.2d 41, 46 (1990). See also
supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
117. Crist, 326 N.C. at 333, 389 S.E.2d at 46. The ethical guideline comes
from the time-honored Oath of Hippocrates, the American Medical Association's
Principles of Medical Ethics and The Current Opinions of the Judicial Council of
the American Medical Association. Id.
118. The fiduciary nature of a patient and physician is well settled in North
Carolina. Black v. Littlejohn, 312 N.C. 626, 646, 325 S.E.2d 469, 482 (1985).
119. Watts v. Cumberland County, 75 N.C. App. .1, 330 S.E.2d 242 (1985),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 317 N.C. 110, 343 S.E.2d 879 (1986), rev'd on other
grounds, 317 N.C. 321, 345 S.E.2d 879 (1986).
120. Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 891
(N.D. Ohio 1965).
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tients would then have litigimate concerns about what information
was being disclosed during the interviews.121 The physician might
unwittingly disclose facts which were still protected by the
privilege. 122
North Carolina demonstrated its dedication to the physician-
patient relationship by enacting legislation making communica-
tions between physicians and patients privileged. Although the
Crist court determined that the privilege was not at issue here, the
court acknowledged that the policy behind the statute was deter-
minative of the case. A physician may be compelled to testify, but
only after a judge determines it is "necessary to a proper adminis-
tration of justice."' 23 By requiring a judge to determine the neces-
sity of disclosure, the legislature demonstrated its policy of pro-
tecting patient confidences. The Crist decision is in accord with
this policy. In creating a physician-patient privilege, legislatures
are concerned with balancing society's interest in the confidential
relationship between a patient and his physician with society's in-
terest in ascertaining the truth in civil lawsuits.12 Ex parte inter-
views would in no way foster either of those interests. 25 Society's
interest in the truth can be satisfied without ex parte interviews
since a-defendant can obtain the same information through formal
discovery. 26 By prohibiting ex parte interviews, society's interest
in preserving the confidence of the physician-patient relationship
will be satisfied by the knowledge that anyone who seeks redress in
court will not have to consent to a complete breakdown of trust
between the plaintiff and his physician. 2 ' The North Carolina leg-
islature obviously holds the physician-patient privilege in high re-
gard, therefore, surely it did not intend to provide defense attor-
neys a way to circumvent the statutory privilege simply by
speaking to treating physicians off the record. Based on the policy
121. See Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, 148 Ill. App. 3d 581, 592, 499
N.E.2d 952, 959 (1986), appeal denied, 106 Ill. Dec. 55, 505 N.E.2d 361 (1987),
cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1007 (1987)(stating "ex parte conferences damage the confi-
dential nature of the physician-patient relationship by violating the patient's
right to believe that his physician is faithfully executing that physician's ethical
obligations").
122. Duquette v. Superior Court, 161 Ariz. App. 269, 276, 778 P.2d 634, 641
(1989).
123. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1989).
124. Petrillo, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 603-04, 499 N.E.2d at 967.
125. Id. at 604, 499 N.E.2d at 967.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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behind the physician-patient privilege, Crist was properly decided.
While the argument can be made that once the plaintiff waives
the privilege the door is open to any contacts which the defend-
ant's attorney may want to pursue, 2 ' this reasoning is faulty. The
patient consents only to discovery of confidential information
through authorized, statutory means of discovery.129 By prohibiting
ex parte contacts, the court assures patients that defense counsel
will be limited to formal discovery.
After assuming the privilege had been waived, the court had to
determine by what procedures and subject to what controls the de-
fendant could obtain the information. 130 The court recognized that
ex parte interviews with nonparty treating physicians are neither
authorized nor prohibited by North Carolina discovery rules.1 31 Al-
though the defendant argued that depositions were expensive and
time consuming," 2 the court responded, as have several other
courts, that depositions are not the only means of discovery. ' 33
Some of the formal discovery devices are inexpensive and time effi-
cient. In addition, they also protect the plaintiff's privacy right.'"
Other courts addressing this issue have required plaintiffs to exe-
cute waivers on grounds of efficiency. 35 Attempts to justify requir-
ing the plaintiff to execute a waiver fail for two reasns. First, as the
128. See, e.g., Green v. Bloodsworth, 501 A.2d 1257, 1259 (Del. Super. Ct.
1985) (holding that once the physician-patient privilege is waived, "the physician
becomes available for interview just like any other witness").
129. See Fields v. McNamara, 189 Colo. 284, 540 P.2d 327 (1975). See also
Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, 148 Ill. App. 3d 581, 499 N.E.2d 952 (1986), ap-
peal denied, 106 Ill. Dec. 55, 505 N.E.2d 361 (1987), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1007
(1987), Roosevelt Hotel Ltd. Partnership v. Sweeney, 394 N.W.2d 353, 353 (Iowa
1986).
130. Crist v. Moffatt, 326 N.C. 326, 334, 389 S.E.2d 41, 46 (1990).
131. Id. at 334, 389 S.E.2d at 46. "Parties may obtain discovery by one or
more of the following methods: depositions upon oral examination or written
questions; written interrogatories; production of documents or things or permis-
sion to enter upon land or other property for inspection and other purposes; phys-
ical and mental examinations; and requests for admission." N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-
1, Rule 26(a)(1983).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 334-35, 389 S.E.2d at 46. Other forms include written interrogato-
ries which are very inexpensive, and medical records are easily obtainable pursu-
ant to the rules. Id.
134. Roosevelt Hotel Ltd. Partnership v. Sweeney, 394 N.E.2d 353, 357 (Iowa
1986).
135. See, e.g., Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126, 129 (D.D.C. 1983); Stem-
pler v. Speidell, 100 N.J. 368, 382, 495 A.2d 857, 864 (1985).
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court noted, some forms of formal discovery are inexpensive. Sec-
ond, the courts allowing ex parte interviews on these grounds "at-
tempt to deal with a question of great societal importance by
merely looking to a set of codified rules and procedures for the
answer."13 The Crist court properly relied on the policy behind
the rules. If some other method of discovery is going to be imple-
mented, such as ex parte interviews, the job of enacting that plan
is not for the courts. The task should be taken up by the legisla-
ture.13 -Moreover, even though ex parte interviews may be less ex-
pensive and provide the defendant some method to equalize tacti-
cal advantage, this benefit to the defendant is greatly outweighed
by the plaintiff's interest in preventing disclosure of personal and
embarrassing facts which are irrelevant to the litigation. 38
The court next turned its attention to the possible liability of
physicians who may inadvertently disclose privileged informa-
tion. ' 9 A physician could quite easily disclose privileged informa-
tion without authorization, considering the difficulty of determin-
ing the extent of the patient's waiver. 40 The Crist court believed
the risk of liability was too great to warrant approval of ex parte
interviews. At least one jurisdiction which allows ex parte inter-
views has attempted to deal with this concern by imposing two re-
quirements on the defendant. The defendant must notify the
plaintiff of the time and place of the interview, and must provide
the physician with a description of the anticipated scope of the
interview."" But this approach defeats itself. Adopting such proce-
136. Petrillo, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 609, 499 N.E.2d at 971.
137. See Sweeney, 394 N.E.2d at 356 (stating that "the addition of a new
discovery method, the court enforced waiver of privilege leading to ex parte infor-
mal interviews with physicians, should be accomplished by a change in the Rules
of Civil Procedure, rather than by judicial fiat. Id.").
138. Crist v. Moffatt, 326 N.C. 326, 335, 389 S.E.2d 41, 46 (citing Nelson v.
Lewis, 130 N.H. 106, 111, 534 A.2d 720, 723 (1987)). See also, Manion v. N.P.W.
Medical Center, 676 F. Supp. 585, 595 (M.D. Pa. 1987) ("any infringement upon
defense counsel's search for the truth is slight and is far outweighed by the pro-
tection afforded to the peculiar relationship between a patient and his physician."
Id.).
139. Crist, 326 N.C. at 335, 389 S.E.2d at 47. North Carolina has recognized
that a patient may recover in tort for unauthorized disclosure of confidential in-
formation in a medical malpractice action. Watts v. Cumberland County, 75 N.C.
App. 1, 9-12, 335 S.E.2d 242, 248-50 (1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 317 N.C.
110, 343 S.E.2d 879 (1986), rev'd on other grounds, 317 N.C. 321, 345 S.E.2d 879
(1986).
140. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
141. Stempler v. Speidell, 100 N.J. 368, 382, 495 A.2d 857, 864 (1985).
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dures would defeat the purposes of ex parte interviews - saving
time and litigation costs. 42
Although a physician may always refuse to participate in an
interview, 43 the Crist court states that the physician may not un-
derstand the difference between formal and informal discovery and
therefore may feel compelled to attend.14 4 The risks of the physi-
cian disclosing confidential information and the possible impropri-
eties which may take place during an ex parte interview 41 are too
great for the court to approve of ex parte interviews.
CONCLUSION
The Crist decision clearly demonstrates North Carolina's in-
terest in protecting the unique relationship between physicians
and patients. The question remains, however, whether this prohibi-
tion on ex parte interviews is limited to medical malpractice ac-
tions. Perhaps it should it be extended to any witnesses with whom
a plaintiff has a unique relationship. Similar factors are present in
other confidential or fiduciary relationships, therefore the prohibi-
tion seems to apply with equal force to them.
The court also leaves open the issue of whether a plaintiff may
waive the physician-patient privilege prior to trial. The answer is
probably no. Considering the emphasis placed on maintaining the
confidential nature of the physician-patient relationship, the court
is not likely to violate this policy by finding a waiver prior to trial.
This factor along with the recognition of a cause of action for
wrongful disclosure by a physician leans against a finding of a pre-
trial waiver. Therefore, disclosure prior to trial by the plaintiff of
facts concerning his or her medical treatment or physical condition
should not be sufficient to constitute a waiver of the privilege.
Something more than mere disclosure by compliance with discov-
142. Roosevelt Hotel Ltd. Partnership v. Sweeney, 394 N.W.2d 353, 357
(Iowa 1986).
143. Crist, 326 N.C. at 335, 389 S.E.2d at 47.
144. Id. (citing Duquette v. Superior Court, 161 Ariz. App. 269, 276, 778 P.2d
634, 641 (1989)).
145. The defense counsel may bring up topics such as damage to a physi-
cian's professional reputation or the rising cost of malpractice insurance, or may
hint that the treating physician may be the next to be sued. Any number of things
could be discussed which may influence the treating physician's views. Manion v.
N.P.W. Medical Center, 676 F. Supp. 585, 594-95 (M.D. Pa. 1987).
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ery rules will be needed to prompt the court to find that the physi-
cian-patient privilege has been waived.
David L. Woodard
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